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HISTORY works many wonders ; none, however, more striking
than that, again and again exemphfied, of the discovery, resur-
rection, and transfiguration of the forerunner. Doubtless, some
day, when America shall at last have produced her great philos-
ophers, a real and really dramatic history of American philosophy
will come to be written and the relatively small and insignificant
thinkers of past and present, although perhaps long forgotten and
never greatly celebrated, may become immortal as forerunners.
Think what Socrates, Plato and Aristotle did for the historic line
of the pre-Socratic philosophers beginning with Thales or
—
pos-
sibly not so remarkably—what Kant and Hegel did for their fore-
runners beginning with Descartes. And, to come to the subject of
this essay, think what Lord r»acon of the seventeenth century and
the natural science whose method he has had the fame of first
clearly formulating, did for Roger Bacon of the thirteenth. Can
it be that resurrection rather than burial is a law of history?
But there is, of course, a dififerent side to the whole matter,
not necessarily Mattering to him or those who have followed. In
the history of philosophy, as in all history, any day or generation
is constantly being found to have, or at least to seem to have,
plagiarized from the past. The forerunner, when brought to life
and justified by some later thinker, often proves to be, not the de-
pendent or subject, but the master, even robbing the later and
widely reputed prophet of his glory. Dr. Jacoby,^ of the University
of (ireifswald, lecturing in America a year ago, found most if
not all of Bergson in Schopenhauer and with a skill not less success-
^ See also Giintlier Jacoby, "Henri Bergson, Pragmatism and Schopen-
hauer," The Monist, Oct, 1912.
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fill and scholarly performed certain other similar feats that all but
turned familiar history topsy-turvy, making a supposedly dead and
ghostly past not merely real and alive but even more real, more
vital or at least more original, than the present. Perhaps Greifs-
wald was unwilling that any good thing should rise from the
fermentations of Paris, but. again to come to the subject of this
essay, of the two Bacons it has been said more than once, not only
that the earlier friar was possessed of more insight and originality
than the later lord, but also that, while the lord doubtless got his
name without benefit of the friar, he nevertheless quietly appro-
priated many of the other sources of his reputation from his more
brilliant as well as more pious forerunner. As to the truth of this
charge it must always remain at least a puzzle why there should
be so many striking and often almost verbal similarities between
the doctrines of the two men ; for example between their protests
against the authority of the past, of medievalism generally and of
the medieval Aristotelianism. between the four idols, or idola, of
the one and the four oifcndiciila of the other; and. not to lengthen
the list here, between the prophecy that Francis made of such
modern wonders as flying-machines, carriages not drawn by beasts,
telephones and submarines and that of the same things proclaimed
by Roger more than four hundred years earlier. Perhaps by sur-
reptitiously introducing all those surprising acrostics Francis Bacon
did not manage to have written Shakespeare, but he does seem to
have been busily writing on passages in the Opera of Roger Bacon
prenatally by several hundred years. In any case, while resurrec-
tion may be one of the laws of history, the later day restoring the
earlier, it does seem also as if at least sometimes the past, hearing
the great trumpet-call, rose up to the serious if not fatal undoing
even of long following generations.
Still, not on the relative greatness or originality of the two
Bacons and their different times must I hold my attention or my
readers'. Whichever man one decide to make the support of the
other, be Roger Bacon the great genius or only the fortunate fore-
runner, there is good reason for the present interest in him. and my
particular contribution to that interest has to do primarily with his
philosophy. Of his philosophy, then, I shall speak under three
heads : metaphysics : methodology : moral philosophy.
The metaphysics is notable in at least three respects. In the
first place, his substance is no mere stuff or material, whether phys-
ical or spiritual, of which things are made by being given some
form, say the form of stone or tree or the image of God. It is no
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mere clay, in itself aimless and lifeless, in the potter's hands. Mere
material can be no more substantial than mere form. In other
words substance, real substance, can lie only in the union of material
and form. So, as I would submit, does the always far-seeing friar
say. only in the rather inadequate language of his time, that sub-
stance is essentially dynamic or active in its own right or nature,
inhering not in the material nor in the idea or form, but in the
process by which material takes form or form expresses itself
materially or, c[uite generally, by which universal and particular,
being inseparable, work in and through each other. His was thus
more a genuinclx Aristotelian or even a Leibnitzian idea of sub-
stance than a scholastic or. to say the least, than a medievally ortho-
dox one. I have added the alternative, because in the doctrine of
substance, as well as in many other doctrines, Roger Bacon's phi-
losophy is an emphatic reminder that the Middle Ages were not
so blind nor so Ijound as they have often appeared to be to the
casual view, and in general I wonder if, instead of feeling surprise
that in men and in ideas the thirteenth century was often alive with
what was "ahead of its times," as the phrase runs, one should not
rather expect to find in a civilization that did finally outgrow itself
living and notable evidences of the coming change.
But. for the second important aspect of the metaphysics, quite
consistently with his idea of substance Bacon holds that mere
material can have no integrity of its own. There can be no single
something, that is, no material one, no one stufif, behind all things ;
a denial, I think, that is directed quite as strongly against any
oneness or singleness or say any homogeneity in the spiritual as in
the physical realm ; for in his vigorous antipantheism Bacon shows
himself opposed both to materialism and to monism as explanation
of the spiritual world. In fact he seems to me to be here a very
true follower of St. Francis himself in that in his feeling or vision,
if not in any of his definite statements, he is become virtually in-
different to the differences of the traditional dualism. For him,
integrity no longer dwelling in the mere stuff of things, what does it
signify whether things belong materially to one realm or the other?
Spiritually or physically the material of things is plural, not singu-
lar ; many, not one. Quantae res, tantae materiae. A harder and
more destructive blow to the dualist's traditional stuffs, merely
of which individuals are made, would be difficult to conceive.
And, thirdly. Bacon the metaphysician, regarding substance
as in the union of material and form and insisting that no mere
material can have any luiity, proceeds to a very logical conclusion,
ROr.RR BACON THE PHILOSOPHER. 489
namely, to the assertion of the prior reahty of individuals in the
world. Universals have no real existence. Whatever claim uni-
versals may have to recognition can lie only in the resemblances
of individuals. Our metaphysician was thus nominalistic, and in
his nominalism, however uncertain and inarticulate it may seem
when compared with that of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,
we have one more evidence of his timely originality and precocity
and a door, set well ajar, by which we may pass from his meta-
physics to his methodology. With the subordination of the one
to the many, of universals to individuals, appear appreciation and
advocacy, theoretical and practical, of induction and experiment.
Others must tell how much or how little was actually accom-
plished through these methods. I am to consider here only Roger
Bacon's sense for method, and in using this phrase *! mean to
indicate in a rough way to what extent he may be called a methodol-
ogist.
In any reflections on Bacon's sense for method one needs to
give very special regard to the times in which Bacon lived. The
sophistication that underlies any adequate appreciation of method
as method, any clearly conscious and well-controlled adaptation
of means to end, can hardly be said to have constituted a con-
spicuous and pronounced factor in the atmosphere of the thirteenth
century. Nor in the cause of the natural genius and timely pre-
cocity of that century do we need to look for such mature sophisti-
cation. Neither church nor state, neither industry nor social life
had reached the deliberation and finesse which that would demand.
Machiavelli or at least Machiavellism—for there may be some
physiologist near at hand—was still three centuries unborn. Jesuitry
was no older. Industrial organization and social custom were wait-
ing—not yet very restlessly—for the Renaissance to make them,
first humanistically awake, self-conscious, zestful, and then, as man,
conscious of his own worth, should come to demand liberation from
all confusion and entanglement with the machinery, the mere instru-
ments and methods, of life, even rationalistic, resorting, as he
finally did to reason and nature that he might escape the constraint
of his own institutions. Chemistry was only alchemy. Astronomy
was astrology. The ritual of religion was exorcistic. All of which
is to say, I think, that in general the method or the formal organi-
zation by which a society trains or educates its members to a sense
of method was not yet abstracted and dehumanized. In every depart-
ment of life society was organized in the spirit of militarism that
directly exploited men, their physical strength, their personal hopes
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and fears, their wants, their habits, their immediate attitudes and
ideas, for all the interests and purposes of life. Human life,
physical, mental and spiritual, was still both end and means. Of
course for man thus to be using his own nature, all its various
forces and resources, for development of himself, was to be ex-
hibiting an inefficiency—suggestive almost of the futility of trying
to lift oneself by one's boot-straps—that must even provoke a
smile in these very modern days of efficiency, but whether in
physical or in mental activities, that military way of exploiting
human nature, of treating it as both end and means, had at least
the value of being educative. Just by being treated in his own
person as a corporate part of the method and machinery of life,
man acquired, let me say, as the natural outcome of his discipline,
the powei* of himself at once freely and in our modern sense
efficiently using method and machinery. He was educated to use
for his own purposes forces and resources that were natural rather
than human, objective rather than subjective, mechanical and phys-
ical rather than military and human. He was made no longer a
soldier, but a mechanic ; no longer a compliant believer, but a
logical thinker ; no longer a mere slavish ritualist in any field, but
an investigator and experimenter. And so, if the Renaissance be
noteworthy as peculiarly the transition period of such a develop-
ment, Roger Bacon's century can hardly be expected to have pro-
duced more than a prophet of it. His own sense for method was
indeed no uncertain sign of what was to come, but such ideas
as he had are not worked out in those details that insure effective-
ness. He, or his methodology, such as it was, only shows that the
education of the medieval organization of society was beginning
to produce substantial results.
Perhaps it is far-fetched to attach any great importance to the
fact that Bacon belonged to one of those orders that must always
be thought of as valuable forerunners of Protestantism and that
in this character showed a strong disposition, by using the church
and its officers rather than being used by them, to turn the exist-
ing organization of life into an external means to life instead of
continuing to confuse it with the end of life. Also it may be
unwise even to make much of Bacon's English extraction. Some
importance, however, must belong both to the Franciscan connec-
tion and the English extraction, although without them a man
very much like our English Franciscan must soon have appeared.
The medieval system had already passed the era of its greatest
formal successes and for any system this era must soon be followed
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by the change, already indicated here, but now somewhat differently
described, from the system's institutional and dogmatic period to
its instrumental and experimental period. Of just this change
Bacon's methodology is a sign or, if the metaphor be not too violent,
an alembic ; and with it, as must now be pointed out carefully, there
came also the generalization or the opening of the view that the
experimental use of anything in distinction from a use so self-
centered as hardly to constitute use at all, or that induction, in
distinction from deduction, must always bring. Deduction, for
example, is naturally committed to some fixed and special system
or law ; it is monarchical and institutional. But induction is bound
only to a general lawfulness, to an open principle of law in things,
being democratic and experimental.
But now I would go even further than suggesting as above I
have suggested, that Bacon's appreciation of experiment and induc-
tion were products of the medieval system and its educative in-
fluences. On one factor of method, as he conceived it, I have not
yet touched. To induction and experiment Bacon added mathe-
matics, in his appreciation of this far excelling his follower of the
same name and possibly excelling, too, even his own appreciation
of experiment and induction. Was the sense for mathematics also
in the atmosphere of his century? Was it also an outcome of the
medieval organization of society? I have to believe that it was.
Possibly, from what has been said already the grounds of this
belief will be easily surmised, but mathematics or mathematicalism
seems to me very like a liberated legalism or institutionalism. It is
a spiritualized and dehumanized, a universalized and objectified
legalism. Thus, again, the spirit of legalism with its tests of formal
consistency belongs to mathematics in the very highest degree, but
in mathematics that spirit has been freed, first, from any one given
system or regime, the "given" in any instance always having the
character of only one among indefinite other hypotheses, and, sec-
ond, from human interest and bias, qualitative differences being
lost in homogeneity and valuations being all quantitative and being
controlled by standardized methods and instruments. An institu-
tional life, then, like that of the medieval church and state, as it
passed from an institutional to an experimental and instrumental
character, was bound to produce, at least among the more respon-
sive and appreciative members of its personnel, not merely the wider
view of experiment and induction, but also the freedom of the
mathematical way of reasoning; and Roger Bacon, at once Eng-
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lishman and Franciscan, was certainly one of the most responsive
and appreciative spirits of his time.
For the rest, it is important to keep in mind that, hke all else
in his philosophy, Bacon's sense for science and its method wsls
more vision than clear and full understanding. He saw much
afar off, but, as said here already, in formulating the details of what
he saw and in effective and productive application he was lacking.
A significant side-light on his methodology is afforded by his
sensitiveness to the deficiencies in the scholarship of his time. Not
only in the sciences would he have a methodical study of nature,
but also in the humanities, notably in the languages and literatures,
he would have men go carefully and methodically to the sources
instead of using most untrustworthy translations then still in vogue.
In his methodology, finally, Bacon was a thinker or seer beyond
his times or beyond what appears as the vogue or the surface of
them. A stick, however, drawn from the water, must still drip,
and in view of this truth, interesting and fascinating to the observer
in many ways, it is refreshing and reassuring to find that with all
his anticipations of the modern standpoint Bacon was still of his
own century, not now because every century of a growing civili-
zation must have its prophets and forerunners, but because he
actually mingled the magic of his day with his method, the blind
and extravagant expectation with his rationalism. The languages,
notably Hebrew, were to be mastered in a few days ; the sciences
in a few weeks. The Berlitz Method for the languages, "while you
wait," and Steele's Physics in Fourteen Weeks,—if I have the title
right,—are but a far cry from Roger's splendid dreams.
Thirdly and lastly, there is the moral philosophy to be con-
sidered. In this, as might be expected, progressivism being always
peculiarly reluctant in matters of religion and morality. Bacon is
disappointing. At least he is disappointing at first sight. Thus
for him moral philosophy is neither more nor less than theology.
Science and reason are handmaids of the church. Although such
empirical generalizations as he makes in the field of morals are
often interesting and show perhaps more than ordinary insight,
ecclesiastical tradition appears as a strong bias in them all. So,
whatever be true of Bacon the metaphysician and methodologist,
Bacon the moral philosopher seems more the medieval friar than
the seer and thinker. But he is indeed a poor friar who is not
more than his gown, and Bacon proves to be in reality much more
even in his moral philosophy, Thus for him moral philosophy or
theology is no discipline by itself, aloof and wholly independent
;
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it is neither more nor less than the crowning science. The term
"sacred" he applies not merely to theology but to other sciences,
like geography and geometry, and with a meaning that no ordinary
theologian of his time could ever intend. Science and reason are
for him truly handmaids of the church, but he is also at least near
to regarding them as in a necessary attendance upon the church
and its faith, and, plainly, if indispensable to the church, they have
a certain independence. Indeed Bacon sometimes concedes to them
a worth quite their own. "We have now considered," he says, at
the beginning of the Opus majus, "philology, mathematics and ex-
perimental science and have observed both" their intrinsic impor-
tance and their value to the church." With this introduction he
proceeds to his moral philosophy or theology, which, as turns out,
he would have based on a synthesis—marvelous to contemplate and
showing the friar in a large role and in danger, too, of an un-
christian if not unholy enthusiasm—of the Mosaic law, Christian
revelation, pagan philosophy, and natural science. Frequently he
quotes Aristotle, Plato, Cicero and Seneca.
So, after all, Roger Bacon, the forerunner and seer, was by no
means altogether lacking in his moral philosophy.
In closing, I would say of Bacon's doctrines at large, of his
life and thought as a whole, that such a man of genuine vision and
enthusiasm, a man not too successful in understanding himself and
in formulating his ideas for others, has an importance that in our
own time may easily be underestimated. Also, after finding him
and getting knowledge of him, historians must gain new interest
and confidence in their studies from the fact that the clear seeing,
the rationalism and the mechanicalism, the experimental science
and the mathematics of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
not to speak of later times and standpoints, had such a worthy
forerunner as early as the thirteenth. Without such prophets as
Bacon, without such men. able to distill the future from the past,
history would surely be a dull and futile science.
